Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 5268 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YE YM YI

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08THEHAGUE553, NETHERLANDS/IRAN: SUPORT FOR ROBUST RESPONSE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08THEHAGUE553.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08THEHAGUE553 2008-06-26 16:04 2011-01-19 20:08 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXRO4003
RR RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTC #0553 1781608
ZNY CCCCC ZH
R 261608Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO UEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1675
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBERSTATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA0162
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4460
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000553

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: PREL KNNPMNUC PARM IR NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: SUPORT FOR ROBUST RESPONSE

REF: A. SECSTATE 6453
B. THE HAGUE 355

Classified By: Politicl Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 24, poloff reviewed develpments in
Iran policy with Dutch MFA officials Lek ten Hagen, Iran
desk officer, Huib Mijnarends,Senior Policy Officer in the
Terrorism and New Treats Unit, and Ceta Noland, Senior
Advisor for uclear Affairs and Nonproliferation. The Dutch
continue to support a robust stance toward Iran athome, the
EU, the IAEA, and the UN. The Dutch wecomed the June 20
briefing for the EU by NEA/IR cting director Dibble. END
SUMMARY.

2. (C) Ntherlands: Noland stated that FM Verhagen had
aproved a new visa policy for Iranian students to prvent
access to nuclear weapons technology -- the olicy will be
publicized within 10 days. The aproved regulations include
list of secured faciliies off limits to masters-level
students from Irn, plus an extensive list of prohibited
areas ofstudy for masters-level students from Iran. (Note
This policy goes beyond the earlier draft regultion that was
reported in reftel B. End Note.)

3. (C) EU / IAEA / UN: Mijnarends stated that theDutch want
the EU needs to start the debate on fll implementation of
UNSC resolution 1803, and tht the Dutch support a robust
implementation. oland indicated that on the IAEA, the Dutch
are isappointed the Board of Governors did not respondto
the latest IAEA report. The Dutch hope for aresolution at
the next Board meeting in September Regarding the UN,
Mijnarends said that the Duth support a UNSC debate on
Iran's response to the P5 1 package after the 30-day
deadline proposed by Dibble during his June 20 briefing.
More generally, Noland cited continuing efforts by Iran to
access weapons technology as well as the long period of
international effort to engage Iran. Mijnarends suggested
that 30 days should be the maximum time allowed for Iran to
respond. Ten Hagen expected Iran to respond in a typical
fashion with efforts to delay and divide the allied response.
FM Verhagen would like to see a swift and positive
response.
Gallagher